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Dear Reader
However necessary independent oversight may
be to ensure environmental compliance, it is never
easy to live with. Regulators often seem to focus on
the wrong issues and to lack appreciation for the
difficulties of compliance and the need for flexibil-
ity. Given a choice, who among the regulated com-
munity could resist opting for a system of self-regu-
lation?
For years, federal facilities have been largely
self-regulated. Now, many are way out of compli-
ance. and the 1992 Federal Facilities Compliance
Act and United States v. Colorado, 23 ELR 20800
(10th Cit. 1993), cert. denied, 114S. CL 922 (1994),
have exposed them to the full range of state enforce-
ment tools. Unlike many of their counterparts in the
private sector (who have weathered environmental
enforcement for almost 25 yeats). government offi-
cials and contractors have few clues about how to
develop systems and attitudes that lead to, and
maintain, compliance. And because unrealistic
compliance schedules can result in fat fees for con-
tractors. those who negotiate on behalf of federal
clients have 8 built-in incentive to accept state regu-
lators' opening positions as gospel.
Faced with these difficulties, the Administra-
tion's instinct with respect to independent oversight
is the same as that of its predecessors: "Make it go
away!" Thus, the Administration's proposed Super-
fund Reform Act would preempt state regulation at
those NFL sites for which EPA decides not to dele-
gate enforcement authority to states. With a simple
NPL listing, EPA could then return any federal
facility to a system of self-regulation-i.e., regula-
tion by the so-called unitary executive-deferring
Indefinitely the need for federal PRPs to face their
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the conditions for effective use of this approach are met.
However, market mechanisms will not set our goals for us
and may even disguise their absence. They are also not
universally adapted to even achieving the goals that we
have set. They will certainly be a useful tool, but only one
I
among many-including product clearance, land use plan-
ning, labeling, "command and control," and removing di-
rect subsidies and tax preferences for environmentally dam-
aging activities-e-that should all have their place in a rational
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When Is "Leaching" Not "Leaking"?: CERCLA Liability of Own-
ers and Operators at the Time of Disposal
by Henry L. Stephens Jr.
[T]he legislative history of CERCLA gives more insight
into the "AliceMin-Wonderlandu-like nature of the evo-
lution of this particular statute than it does helpful hints
on the intent of the legislature.
The statement quoted above, from a recent federal courtdecision, I captures some of the frustration experienced
by those who attempt to divine congressional intent regarding
the scope of property owners' liability under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980,2 as amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 3 (CERCLA). 4 CERCLA imposes
liability on, inter alia, past owners or operators of property
whose relationship to the property coincided with "the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance" on the property. s
Some recent court decisions have interpreted this language
expansively to include essentially every grantee in the chain
of title to contaminated realty, irrespective of the grantee's
acts, omissions, or authority to control practices regarding
hazardous substances at the site. 6 Under these decisions, a
former owner of tainted property-who held title for only a
few minutes to serve as a middleman in a real estate transac-
tion-may be subject to joint and several liability for all costs
associated with cleanup of a site if previously disposed of
substances migrated underground during the grantee's owner-
ship. 7 Proponents of such an all encompassing liability scheme
find support in the Fourth Circuit's recent pronouncements in
Nurad, Inc. v, William E. Hooper & Sons Co. • The rationale
of the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Nurad, however, was
sharply criticized in a well-reasoned opinion of the U.S. District
Henry L. Stephens Jr. is Professor of Law at Salmon P. Chase College
of Law, Northern Kentucky University and Executive Director of the
Ohio Valley Environmental and Natural Resources Law Institute, Inc. He
is of Counsel to Robinson & McElwee. Charleston, West Virginia, and
Lexington, Kentucky.
1. HRW Systems, Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co., 823 F. Supp.
318,327,23 ELR 21586,21588 (D. Md. 1993).
2. Pub.L. No. 96-510.94 Stat. 2767 (1980).
3. Pub. L. No. 99-499,100 Stat. 1613(1986).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§9601-9675,ELR STAT.CERCLA§§101-405.
5. 42 U.S.c. §9607(a)(2),ELR STAT.CERCLA§107(a)(2).
6. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837,22 ELR 20936 (4th Cir.), cerr. denied, 113S. Ct. 377 (1992);
GraybillTerminal Co.v.UnionOilCo.ofCal.,No.92-Q238-K(LSP)
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1993);HRW, 823 F. Supp. at 318, 23 ELR at
21586.
7. Graybill Terminal c«, No. 92-0238-K(LSP) (S.D. Cal. Jan. 4,
1993), discussed in 7 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1182, 1182-83(Mar.
10,1993). See also O'Neil v. Picillo,833F.2d 176,178-79,20ELR
20115, 20116-17 (1st Cir. 1989); United State, v. Bliss, 667 F.
Supp. 1298,1313,18ELR20055.20061(E.D.Mo. 1987)(applying
joint and several liability in the absence of divisible harm).
8. 966 F.2d 837, 22 ELR 20936 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
377 (1992).
Court for the Northern District of lllinois in United States v,
Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc, 9
This Dialogue argues that the policies underlying CER-
CLA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), 10 as well as the actions of Congress in fashioning
CERCLA's liability scheme, require the conclusion that
courts faced with the "active versus passive disposal" issue
should adopt the rationale of Petersen Sand and eschew the
strained logic underlying Nurad. Following a brief discus-
sion of pertinent points of CERCLA's liability scheme, the
Dialogue discusses the factual scenario present in both
Nurad and Petersen Sand. The Dialogue next discusses the
history behind RCRA's definition of "disposal," comparing
Congress' objectives in RCRA with the congressional de-
sires manifested in CERCLA. Following an examination
of the court's reasoning in Nurad, the Dialogue argues that
Congress had every opportunity when drafting CERCLA
to use precise language to achieve the expansive result
obtained in Nurad and declined to go so far. The Dialogue
concludes that courts should respect Congress' choice of
one path over the other and adopt the well-reasoned analysis
of Petersen Sand.
CERCLALiability
During the waning days of the Carter Administration, Con-
gress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 in response to
perceived failures of existing environmental legislation.
Congress saw RCRA---the seminal congressional effort in
the regulation of hazardous wastes-as primarily regula-
tory, rather than remedial, in nature. indeed, RCRA was
designed to address problems created by present and future
generation and management of hazardous wastes, and was
intended to apply to inactive sites only in the event such
inactive sites posed imminent hazards, It RCRA's inability
to comprehensively deal with abandoned dump sites such
as the famous Love Canal ostensibly produced the need for
CERCLA.12
9. 806 F. Supp. 1346,23 ELR 20480 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
10. 42 U.S.c. §§6901-6987,ELR STAT.RCRA§§1001-6992k.
11. See Lynda 1. Oswald & Cindy K. Schipani, Legal Theory: CERCU
and the "Erosion" of Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV.259,264 (1992) [hereinafterOswald& Schipani](citing
H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 22. reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6125 (RCRA "is prospective and applies to
past sites only to the extent that they are posing an imminent
hazard")).
12. Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11. See also H.R. REP. No. 1016,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I, at 17-18. reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6120 (noting that ReRA is "clearly inadequate" in dealing with
the "massive problem" of existing hazardous waste sites).
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RCRA went through Congress with "little or no debate,
as it was rushed through during a session's final hours.""
Likewise, CERCLA "was passed hastily by Congress as
compromise legislation after very limited debate under a
suspension of the rules." 14 Despite these shortcomings,
however:
Congress [in CERCLAj expressed its major policy goals
quite clearly. Thus, the statute's objectives are the fol-
lowing: to encourage maximum care and responsibility
in the handling of hazardous waste; to provide for rapid
response to environmental emergencies; to encourage
voluntary clean-up of hazardous waste spills; to encour-
age early reporting of violations of the statute; and to
ensure that parties responsible for release of hazardous
substances bear the costs of response and cost of damage
to natural resources. IS
CERCLA assigns the burden of responsibility for cleanup
costs incurred by governmental and private parties to four
classes of persons, knO~1Das "potentially responsible par-
ties": (1) the current owner and operator of a hazardous
waste vessel or facility; 16 (2) any person, who at the time
of disposal of any hazardous substance, owned or operated
any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of; 17 (3) any person who arranged for disposal or
treatment of a hazardous substance at any facility owned
or operated by another person; 18 and (4) any transporter of
hazardous substances to a facility. 19
13. See United States v, Waste Indus., Inc., 556 F. Supp. 1301,1311,
13 ELR 20286,20291 (E.D.N.C. 1982),rev'd on other grounds,
734 F.2d 159, 14ELR 20461 (4th Cir. 1984)[thedistrict court's
decision is hereinafter cited as Waste Indus. Trial].
14. See United States v. Mottola, 605 F. Supp. 898,902,15 ELR 20444,
20445 (D.N.H. 1985); Oswald & Schipani, supra note 11, at 267
& n.38.
15. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Annstrong World Indus., Inc.,
669 F. Supp. 1285, 1290n.6, 18ELR 20191,20193n.6 (E.D.Pa.
1987)(emphasisadded).
16. 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(I),ELRSTAT.CERCLA§107(a)(I).
17. Id. §%07(a)(2),ELR STAT.CERCLA§107(a)(2).
18. Id. §9607(a)(3),ELR STAT.CERCLA§107(a)(3).
19. Id. §9607(a)(4),ELR STAT.CERCLA§107(a)(4).CERCLAstates
in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and
subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this
section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any haz-
ardous substance owned or operated any facility at which
such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of haz-
ardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by
any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration
vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities,
incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from
which there is a release, or a threatened release which
causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous
substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred
by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency
This Dialogue concerns §I07(a)(2), which, read in con-
junction with §I07(a)(4)(A)-(D), imposes liability for the
cost of remedying releases of hazardous substances on
persons who owned or operated facilities at the time of
disposal of hazardous substances.j" While Congress, in
drafting CERCLA, borrowed the term "disposal" from
RCRA,21 it created the new term "release" and precisely
defined it to include, inter alia, "disposal." 22 Although
"release" includes "disposal," every release does not nec-
essarily constitute disposal, since RCRA does not define
"disposal" to include "release." 23 The fact that courts may
be confused as to the application of these two terms is not
surprising.
Judicial Constructions of "Release" and "Disposal"
The factual scenario that creates the greatest difficulty for
courts considering whether to hold former owners or op-
erators of contaminated property liable under CERCLA
§107(a)(2) is quite common. 1n the past, some person or
entity allowed hazardous substances to enter the environ-
ment through an act or omission, such as pouring waste on
the land, burying drums which subsequently ruptured, or
using underground storage tanks containing hazardous sub-
stances and abandoning those tanks in place. 24Later, after
completion of this active disposal, the site was leased or
sold to a person or entity who may not have used hazardous
substances at all, and may have had no knowledge of prior
plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of as-
sessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or safety effects
study carried out under section 9604(i) of this title.
42 U.S.c. §9607(a),ELR STAT.CERCLA§107(a).
20. It is significant that Congress imposed liability retrospectively in
§107(a)(2) only upon "owners" and "operators" who had that status
at the time of disposal. As will be explained in more detail infra,
Congress could have retrospectively imposed liability upon owners
and operators of facilities at the time of the release. Its failure to
reach so broadly into the past is significant and must be presumed
to have been the product of conscious choice. See United States v.
Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1351,23 ELR
20480,20482(N.D. Ill. 1988).
21. CERCLA §101(29) provides that "the tenus 'disposal,' 'hazardous
waste,' and 'treatment' shall have the meaning provided in §1004
of the Solid Waste Disposal Act [42 U.S.c. §6903]" (brackets in
original). 42 U.S.c. §9601(29), ELR STAT.CERCLA §101(29).
This RCRA section provides:
The term "disposal" means the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such
solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof
may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters.
42 U.S.c. §6903(3),ELR STAT.RCRA §tOO4(3).
22. ''The term 'release' means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the aban-
donment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed re-
ceptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or con-
taminant) .... " 42 U.S.C. §9601(22), ELR STAT.CERCLA
§101(22)(emphasisadded).
23. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351,23 ELR at 20482.
24. See, e.g., Nurad, Inc. v, William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d
837.840,22 ELR20936,20937(4thCir.), cert. denied, t 13S. Ct.
377 (1992).
)
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disposal practices at the site. Having been released into the
environment by prior owners or operators, however, haz-
ardous substances continue to migrate through soil and
groundwater, coming to rest in locations other than where
originally placed. .
Imposing liability on those persons who actively placed
waste into the environment or abandoned waste in such a
way that it could escape into the environment could hardly
offend traditional notions of justice and fair p,lay. But in
Nurad," its predecessors.f" and its progeny, 7 the courts
go further, fmding that mere movement of substances
through soil and groundwater constitutes "disposal," m~k-
ing the unwitting owner or operator-who took no action
with respect to the waste- "the owner or operator at the
time of disposal." The phrase "passive disposal" is often
used to describe this rationale for imposing liability on one
whose only sin was possession of property at the time of
migration of hazardous substances that had been actively
disposed of by another.
The History of the Term "Disposal"
The Ninth Circuit explained in Wilshire Westwood Associ-
ates v. Atlantic Richfield Corp. 28 that; "The plain language
of a statute is the starting point for its interpretation ....
[But courts] must look beyond the express language of a
statute where a literal interpretation 'would thwart the pur-
pose of the over-all statutory scheme or lead to an absurd
result. ... 29
Because "disposal" is a term defined in RCRA, and incor-
porated by reference into CERCLA,30 Congress' intention
regarding the term's scope for purposes of RCRA should
determine use of the term with respect to CERCLA liability.
Although a CERCLA "release" may encompass more activi-
ties and thus be broader than a RCRA "disposal," 31 a CERCLA
"disposal" is identical to a RCRA "disposal."
The most cogent analysis of Congress' purpose in for-
mulating RCRA's definition of "disposal" appears in a
district court opinion which was reversed by the Fourth
Circuit. In United States v. Waste Industries, Inc.,32 the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina
ruled that RCRA's imminent hazard provision (as it existed
before amendment in 1984)33 did not apply to a dump site
25. Id. at 846, 22 ELR at 20940.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Indus., Inc., 734 F.2d 159, 164-65,
14ELR 20461, 20462-63 (4th Cir. 1984); Stanley Works v. Sny-
dergeneralCorp., 781 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
27. Graybill Terminal Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 92-0238-K(LSP)
(S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1993).
28. 881 F.2d 801,19 ELR 21313 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. Id. at 803-04, 19 ELR at 21314 (citations omitted), quoted in Stanley
Works, 781 F. Supp at 663.
30. See supra note 21.
31. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text
32. 556F. Supp. 1301,13ELR 20286(E.D.N.C. 1982),rev'd on other
grounds, 734 F.2d 159, 14ELR20461 (4th Cir. 1984).The Fourth
Circuit's Waste Indus. opinion formed the basis for its reversal of
the district court's analysis in Nurad in 1992. Nurad, Inc. v. William
E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 22 ELR 20936 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 113S. Ct. 377 (1992).
33. RCRA §7003, circa 1982, allowed EPA to bring an action to restrain
against any person contributing to handling, storage, treatment,
transportation, or disposal of solid or hazardous wastes that may
present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or to
that had become inactive prior to the effective date of
RCRA. 34The district court rejected the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA's) claim that prior "disposal"
activity triggered the imminent hazard provisions of RCRA,
holding: "'Disposal' involves ... some active [concurrent]
human conduct, i.e., someone disposing of the waste. Aside
from any legislative definition of disposal, the term entails
some active, affirmative action which may be prospectively
regulated by standards and permit requirements.""
The Waste Industries' district court, although reaching
the wrong result, correctly examined the statutory definition
of "disposal" in light of the prospective regulatory approach
of RCRA, Noting RCRA's predominant purpose of imp os-
ing regulatory and permit requirements on those engaged
in treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes, 36 the
court reasoned that Congress' use of the terms "discharge,
deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing"
to define the term "disposal" "suggest[s] a legislative intent
of covering all ways in which a person might dispose of
hazardous waste." 37 The district court stated that the prin-
ciple of ejusdem generis " requires that general terms, such
as "leak" and "spill," be read as containing the elements
common to the specific terms, i.e., deposit, inject, dump,
and place. 39 The court cogently noted that the common
element among all the terms included within the definition
of "disposal" is an act carried out by a person and thus
concluded that Congress intended "leak" and "spill" to
include unintentional acts of disposal. 40 The district court
failed to recognize, however, that the "active human con-
duct" necessary for "leaking" can, and usually does, pre-
cede the leaking itself.
Holding that RCRA's imminent hazard provision applies
to inactive waste sites, the Fourth Circuit reversed, con-
cluding that use of the term "leaking" demonstrates a con-
gressional intent to reach environmental degradation occur-
ring after the point in time when the active human conduct
set in motion the chain of events leading to such degrada-
tion.4t But the disparity in the district and appellate courts'
the environment Waste Indus. Trial, 556 F. Supp. at 1304, 13 ELR
at 20287. Congress amended §7003 in 1984, to explicitly apply to
past or present conduct. See 42 U.S.C. §6973, ELR STAT. RCRA
§7003.
34. RCRA's primary implementing regulations became effective on
Nov. 19, 1980.45Fed. Reg. 33066-259(1980)(sixdifferentrules).
The Remington site at issue in Waste Indus. ceased operating on
June 30, 1979. Waste Indus. Trial, 556 F. Supp. at 1303, 13 ELR
at 20287.
35. 556 F. Supp. at 1305, 13ELR 20288(footnoteemitted).
36. It!. at 1306, 13ELR at 20288.
37. It!.
38. Under the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, w:here
general words follow the enumeration of partic~lar classes of .thmgs,
the general words will be construed as applying only to things of
the same general class as those enumerated. BLACK'S LAW DIC-
TIONARY517 (6th ed, 1990).
39. Standing alone, "leaking" and "spilling" do not seem to require
. any antecedent affirmative human conduct.
40. Waste Indus. Trial, 556 F. Supp. at 1306, 13ELRat 20288.
41. Waste lndus., 734 F.2d 159, 164, 14 ELR 20461,20463 (4th Cir.
1992). The court stated:
The inclusion of "leaking" as one of the diverse definitional
components of "disposal" demonstrates that Congress in-
tended "disposal" to have a range of meanings, including
conduct, a physical state, and an occurrence. Discharging,
dumping, and injection (conduct), hazardous waste reposing
24 ELR 10180 ENVIRONMENTALLAWREPORTER
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views of the scope of the term "disposal" hinged nol on
whether active human conduct is required to trigger "dis-
posal," but rather on whether disposal by "leaking" requires
concurrent human conduci (the district court's view) or
whether it can simply occur as a result of prior human
conduci (the Fourth Circuit's view). 42
In Waste Industries, neither the districl court nor the
Fourth Circuit were faced with determining whether the
term "disposal" applies to a party who engaged in no
affirmative conduct respecting the placement of waste on
land and who is merely a former owner or operator of a
parcel on which prior dumping, leaking, or spilling of
wastes occurred. It is one thing to hold a party liable for
his or her affirmative conduct which does not manifest itself
until years later when the drums placed in the ground sub-
sequently leak; it is another to extend that liability to a
second party, who merely happened to possess the parcel
when those drums ultimately rot and leak. Unfortunately,
when faced with determining the liability of this wholly
passive property owner in Nurad, some eight years after
Waste Industries, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize this
critical distinction.
The Strained Reasoning ofNurad
In Nurad, both the district court 4J and the Fourth Circuit
were faced with facts decidedly different from those pre-
sented in Waste Industries. Plaintiff Nurad, Inc. flied a
private cost recovery action as a result of its discovery of
a long-abandoned underground storage tank which was
found to have leaked hazardous substances under a portion
of the site known as Hooperwood Mills Industrial Park in
Baltimore, Maryland. Defendant William E. Hooper & Sons
Co. (Hooper), during its ownership of the site, used these
underground storage tanks to store mineral spirits and sub-
sequently abandoned the tanks and their contents. At that
time, Hooper sold the site along with the underground
storage tanks and their contents to defendant Nicoll. Thir-
teen years later, in 1976, defendant Kenneth Mumaw en-
tered into a contract to purchase the park and, later that
year, closed the contract by taking title, subdividing the site
into parcels, and transferring title to the appropriate parcels
to Nurad, Inc. and others. 44 Itwas undisputed that defendant
Mumaw's only actions with respect to the site related only
(a physical state) and movement of the waste after it has
been placed in a state of repose (an occurrence) are all
encompassed in the broad definition of disposal. "Leaking"
ordinarily occurs when landfills are not constructed soundly
or when drums and tank trucks filled with waste materials
corrode, rust, or rot. Thus "leaking" is an occurrenceinc1uded
in the meaning of "disposal."
[d. Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey
noted: "[L]eaking ... ordinarily occurs not through affirmative
action but as a result of inaction or negligent past actions." United
States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071, II ELR 21047, 21054
(D.N.J. 1981),aff'd, 688 F.2d 204, 12ELR 21020(3d Cir. 1982).
42. Nurad, Inc. v. WilliamE. Hooper& SonsCo.. 966 F.2d 837,846,
22ELR20936,20940(4thCir.),cert. denied, 113 S.o. 377(1992).
43. Nurad, Inc. v.William E. Hooper & Sons Co., No. WN 90-661, 22
ELR 20079 (D. Md. Aug. 15, 1991) [hereinafter Nurad Trial].
44. [d. at 20080. See also the cogent criticism of the Fourth Circuit's
Nurad opinion in Samuel A. Bleicher, Redefining the CERCLA
Uability of Former Owners, Tenants, and Operators, 7 Tcxics L.
Rep. (BNA)224, 225 (July 15, 1992) [hereinafterBleicher].
to taking legal title, which he retained only as long as
necessary to convey title to Nurad, Inc. and others.45 "So
far as the records show, no one filled, emptied, or otherwise
used or managed the [tanks] in 1976, and no evidence
indicates that the [tanks] were even leaking at that time. ,,46
Nevertheless, Nurad, Inc. sought to hold Mumaw liable for
cleanup costs incurred at the site, arguing that the passive
migration and reposing of hazardous substances at the site
during the brief tenure of Mumaw's ownership constituted
"disposal" under CERCLA §107(a)(2).47 Nurad, Inc. ar-
gued that this result was mandated by the Fourth Circuit's
Waste Industries opinion.
The district court disagreed with the plaintiff's assertion
that Waste Industries controlled the case, stating:
That case, which was not a CERCLA action, addressed
a different factual and legal context than the one presented
here. In Waste Industries. the court considered whether
in 1979 the EPA had authority under RCRA to require
remediation by former owners or operators of an inactive
landfill. The Fourth Circuit ruled that RCRA §7003 is
"designed to deal with situations in which the regulatory
schemes break down or have been circumvented ....
Congress expressly intended that this other language
(RCRA §7003) close loopholes in environmental protec-
tion." Applying the law as it was before the enactment
of CERCLA, it appears that the only way for the Waste
Industries court to preserve EPA's ability to demand
cleanup by the actual former owners and operators was
to define "disposal" in RCRAtocovercompleteirlassive
repose or movement through the environment.
The district court distinguished Waste Industries on sev-
eral grounds. First, unlike defendant Mumaw, the former
tenants in Waste Industries had actively disposed of haz-
ardous waste on the property. Further, Waste Industries
raised no question regarding the fairness of imposing CER-
CLA liability on a party who never undertook any waste-
related activity whatsoever. The district court noted that
although CERCLA adopts the definition of "disposal"
found in RCRA, it also adds the term "release" to cover
both active and passive conditions. The court reasoned that
in enacting CERCLA, Congress expressly limited CERCLA
liability to former owners "at the time of disposal," "a
phrase which must refer to an action or have no meaning
at all."4. In so holding, the district court relied heavily on
Ecodyne Corp. v. Shah, so in which a district court employed
an ejusdem generis analysis (similar to that employed by
the Waste Industries district court) and concluded that to
read "disposal" to include passive migration without any
preceding or concurrent affirmative human conduct with
respect to the wastes by the defendant in question would
"make all property owners from the time a site became
polluted (up to and including the current owner) potentially
liable under section 9607(a)(2) even if these owners did
45. Bleicher, supra note 44.
46. Id. at 226.
47. Nurad Trial, 22 ELR at 20086.
48. Id. at 20087. However, even under the facts presented in Waste
Indus., affirmative waste disposal conduct preceded the passive
migration of the wastes that was occurring at the time of the action
instituted by the government.
49. Id.
50. 718 F. Supp. 1454, 1457,20 ELR20172,20174 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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not introduce chemicals onto the site."" Therefore, the
court reasoned, because Congress intended that courts im-
pose CERCLA liability on those responsible for the con-
tamination, the expansive interpretation of the term "dis-
posal" urged by plaintiff Nurad, Inc. would sweep too
broadly. 52
The Fourth Circuit reversed the well-reasoned opinion
of the district court and held that Waste Industries controlled
the case." The Fourth Circuit chided the district court for
its restrictive interpretation of RCRA's defmition of "dis-
posal," stating: "[Hjazardous waste may leak or spill with-
out any active human participation. The district court arbi-
trarily deprived these words of their passive element by
imposing a requirement of active participation as a prereq-
uisite to liability.""
The Fourth Circuit was apparently distressed by the fact
that under the district court's view a facility's current
owner would be liable under CERCLA § 107(a)(I)," even
if only passive disposal took place during his or her own-
ership, but a former owner could escape liability if active
"disposal" did not take place during his or her watch. '0
As a consequence, the Fourth Circuit reached the strained
conclusion that § 107(a)(2) imposes liability not only for
active involvement in the "dumping" or "placing" of
hazardous waste at the facility, but also for mere owner-
ship of the facility at the time hazardous waste was "spill-
ing" or "leaking."57
Despite its strained logic and draconian result, Nurad, as
the only appellate court opinion deciding CERCLA liability
of former owners for "passive" disposal, has been followed
in lemming-like fashion by district courts not bent upon
undertaking scrutiny of RCRA's definition of "disposal. ",.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
however, reached a contrary result in its well-reasoned opin-
ion in United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc. s.
5!. ld: See alsa In re DiamondRio Trucks, Inc., 115 B.R. 559, 565
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) (concluding that "the mere ownership
of the site during the period of time in which migration or leaching
may have taken place without any active disposal activities does
not bring [the defendant] within the liability provision of section
9607(a)(2)");StevensCreekAss'n v. BarclaysBank,915F.2d 1355
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2014 (1991) (construing
"disposal" for purposes of § 107(a){2) as requiring some affirmative
act of discarding a substance as a waste).
52. Nurai/ Trial, 22 ELR at 20087.
53. Nurad, Inc. v. WilliamE. Hooper& SonsCo., 966 F.2d 837, 845,
22ELR 20936,20939(4thCir.),cert. denied, 113S.c, 377(1992).
54. Id.
55. This section simply imposes liability on "the owner and operator
ofa vesselor facility."42U.S.c. §9607(a)(I),ELRSTAT.CERCLA
§107(a)(I).
56. "The district court's view thus introduces the anomalous situation
where a current owner, such as Nurad, who never used the storage
tanks could bear a substantial share of the cleanup costs, while a
former owner who was similarly situated would face no liability at
all." Nurad, 966F.2dat845,22ELRat20939.AsnotedinBleicher's
well-reasoned article, "neither the district court nor the court of
[a]ppeals gave any consideration to the benefit of cleanup that flows
to the current owner by increasing the value of its property. EPA
regularly asserts unjust enrichment as a rationale for current owner
liability." Bleicher, supra note 44, at 228 n.16.
57. Nurad, 966 F.2d at 846, 22 ELR at 20940.
58. See. e.g .• Graybill Terminal Co. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., No.
92-D238-K(LSP)(S.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 1993);HRW Systems, Inc. v.
WashingtonGas Light Co., 823 F. Supp. 318, 23 ELR 21586 (D.
Md. 1993).
59. 806 F. Supp. 1346,23 ELR 20480 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
Petersen Sand
The Petersen Sand court analyzed the propriety of the gov-
ernment's claim that Petersen, Inc. was liable as an "owner
at the time of disposal" under CERCLA §I07(a)(2), not-
withstanding the absence of proof that Petersen, Inc. en-
gaged in any waste disposal activity at the site during its
tenure of ownership. 60 Noting that no court in the Seventh
Circuit had yet ruled on the issue of whether passive disposal
may form the basis of liability under §107(a)(2), the district
court relied on the Seventh Circuit's instructions regarding
interpretation of CERCLA contained in Edward Hines Lum-
ber Co. v. Vulcan Material Co.O\ In Edward Hines, the
Seventh Circuit adopted a moderate approach to judicial
expansions of CERCLA liability, stating that a "court's job
is to fmd and enforce stopping points no less than to im-
plement other legislative choices.',02 Using this approach,
the Petersen Sand court concluded that "passive disposal"
does not trigger §107(a)(2) liability. OJ Noting the split of
authority on the issue of the liability of former owners for
"passive disposal," 64 the court focused on the definition of
"disposal" in RCRA and reasoned' that for an event to be
"disposal" under RCRA's definition, the event must be
such that waste "may enter the environment or be emitted
into the air or discharged into any waters."6S In contrast,
"passive disposal" consists of migration of substances that
have already entered the environment and are simply mov-
ing from place to place. 66 In other words, passive migration
of waste cannot be "disposal" because "disposal" occurs
before substances enter the environment. The court further
reasoned that Congress saw and appreciated this distinction
when it defmed "release" in CERCLA as a series of events
(such as spilling or leaking) followed simply by the words
"into the environrnent:'67
Not content to rely on language distinctions alone, the Pe-
tersen Sand court analyzed the contextual relationship in CER-
CLA between the terms "release" and "disposal."" The court
noted that there was no dispute about whether passive migra-
tion constitutes a "release." The only question was whether
such migration is "disposal." The court noted that "release"
includes "disposal," but "disposal" does not include "re-
lease." "In some way, therefore, 'release' must bemore inclu-
sive than 'disposal.''''' The court opined that Congress must
have appreciated the passive migration issue and, in the course
of drafting CERCLA, declined to make the liability of past
owners or operators depend on a "release" rather than "dis-
posal." Instead, "Congress designed the entire CERCLA re-
sponse scheme to activate whenever a 'release' occurred, but
limited the liability for (past] operators to those who were
operators during a 'disposal.''' 70
60. ts. at 1348,23 ELR at 20480.
61. 861F.2d 155, 19ELR 20187 (7th Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 157, 19ELR at 20188 (citationsomitted).
63. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp at 1350,23 ELR at 20482.
64. Compare EcodyneCorp. v. Shah,718F. Supp. 1454,20ELR20172
(N.D. Cal. 1989) with cases cited supra notes 25 & 27.
65. See 42 U.S.c. §6903(3),ELR STAT.RCRA§1004(3).
66. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1351,23 ELRat 20482.







The distinction Congress intended to create between "re-
lease" and "disposal" is reflected in the so-called innocent
owner defense, added to CERCLA in 1986. The court noted
that one can claim the benefit of the defense when
[flhe real propertyon which the facility concernedis
locatedwasacquiredby the defendantafter thedisposal
or placement of the hazardous substance on, in. or at the
facility,and ... at the time the defendantacquiredthe
facilitythedefendantdidnotknowandhadno reasonto
knowthatanyhazardoussubstancewhichis the subject
of the release or threatened release was disposed of on,
in, or at the facility ,11
The court noted that unless the term "disposal" was
limited to its active meaning, the "innocent owner defense"
would apply in only the rarest of circumstances and only
to those innocent owners "who are fortunate enough to
have purchased a facility where all the hazardous waste is
sealed in concrete-s-eny seeping or leaking on a site occur-
ring after the purchase would eliminate the defense ." 72 The
court reasoned that the innocent owner amendment had an
undeniably plain purpose: excluding from liability those
owners or operators who bought or operated the site after
the hazardous waste was placed on the land and knew
nothing about the hazardous waste at the time the site was
acquired. 73
The court took pains to distinguish Nurad and its prog-
eny;" which had held prior owners in the chain of title
liable as "owners at the time of disposal" for passive mi-
gration. In a footnote, the court explained that although
Nurad did not consider the "innocent owner" argument,
the court in Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp. 75 had
rejected the argument outright. 7' The Peterson Sand court
dismissed the treatment of the issue provided in Stanley
Works, noting: "If 'disposal' is an ongoing passive process
that includes any movement through the environment, it
would be the rare owner indeed who acquired the land
[utilizing the language of the 'innocent owner defense']
'after disposal .. ··" The court reached "[t]he inescapable
conclusion ... that giving 'disposal' a passive meaning
controverts the plain language of CERCLA .' ' 78
The Petersen Sand court took issue with a concern
expressed in Nurad that limiting "disposal" to active
conduct would be at odds with CERCLA's liability struc-




74. See cases cited supra notes 25 & 27.
75. 781 F. Supp. 659 (E.D. Cal. 1990).
76. The Peterson Sand court noted the following as the only discussion
~nStanley Works: "[W]hile it is no doubt more likely that the
innocent purchaser defense will prevail in circumstances involving
passive disposal, this will not always be the case." Petersen Sand,
806 F. Supp. at 1352 n.3, 23 ELR at 20482 n.3 (citing Stanley
Works, 781 F. Supp. at 664).
77. Ed.
78. Ed. at 1352, 23 ELR at 20482. See. e.g., 42 U.S.c. §9601(9)(B),
ELR STAT. CERCLA §101(9)(B) (defining "facility" as. inter alia.
an area where a hazardous substance has been "disposed of'); 42
U.S.C. §9601(23), ELR STAT.CERCLA §101(23) (including "the
disposal of removed material" in the term "removal") (emphasis
added): 42 U.S.c. §9603(c), ELR STAT.CERCLA §103(c) (referring
to a "facility" where hazardous waste has been "stored, treated or
disposed of') (emphasis added).
ture.79 Merely requiring "disposal" to be active before
imposing liability is not tantamount to grafting a "fault"
requirement onto CERCLA's liability scheme. 8. Reason-
ing that the imposition of liability under CERCLA is based
upon public policy rather than any conception of fairness
or culpability, the court held that courts within the Seventh
Circuit must decipher where Congress intended to place
the limit on such liability. 81
The court also dismissed the Nurad court's concern that
not including passive events as "disposal" would discour-
age private action to clean up environmental hazards, 82Any
concern that property owners with knowledge would simply
pass title along to unwitting grantees is at odds with the
express language of the "innocent owner defense," which
provides that the defense is never available to a person who
(1) obtained actual knowledge of a release while such person
owned the property and (2) subsequently transferred it with-
out disclosing facts concerning the release. 83 Finally, citing
CERCLA's criminal provisions applicable to failures to
report releases, as well as the existence of state common
law protecting land purchasers from intentionally hidden
defects, the court in Petersen Sand found these constraints
sufficient to close any loophole "that Congress may have
left open by only imposing liability on those who are owners
or operators at the time of an active event constituting
disposal of a hazardous substance." 84 Accordingly, the
court denied the motion of the United States for summary
judgment against Petersen, Inc., since genuine issues of
material of fact existed concerning whether Petersen, Inc.
was an owner or operator of the facility at the time of a
disposal of hazardous substances. es
Leaking Versus Leaching
Passive migration of hazardous constituents is commonly
called "leaching." 8. Although "leaching" is specifically
included as an event constituting a "release," as that term
is defined in CERCLA,87 it is not included within the
definition of "disposal" in RCRA.88 Curiously, no court
has yet discussed Congress' having specifically recognized
79. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1352, 23 ELR at 20483 (citing
Nurad, Inc. v, William E. Hooper & Sons Co .•966 F.2d 837, 845-46,
22 ELR 20936, 20939 (4th Cir.), cat. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992)).
80. [d. For example, one who "safely and carefully" buries drums which
subsequently leak is liable under § 107(a)(2) as an "owner at the
time of disposal" notwithstanding that he may have exercised all
due care at the time of disposal.
81. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1352, 23 ELR at 20483 (citing
Edward Hines, 861 F.2d 155, 157, 19 ELR 20187, 20188 (7th CiL
1988)).
82. [d. The Nurad court stated that by limiting "disposal" to active
conduct, "an owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle
while a~ environmental hazard festers on his property ... [and
transfemng] the property before any response costs are incurred."
Nurad, Inc. Y. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845,
22 ELR 20936, 20939 (4th CiL). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 377 (1992).
83. Petersen Sand, 806 F. Supp. at 1353,23 ELR at 20483 (citing 42
U.S.c. §9601(35)(C), ELR STAT.CERCLA §101(35)(C)).
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Ed.
86. The term "leach" is defined as "causing a liquid to filter down
through some material." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 801 (2d college ed. 1978).
87. See supra note 22.
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the passive migration issue by including "leaching" in its
definition of "release" in CERCLA. Since Congress spe-
cifically declined to levy CERCLA liability upon "owners
and operators at the time of the release," it specifically
declined to impose liability on owners who have no nexus
to waste disposal activities other than simply having been
owners or operators while leaching took place.
Conclusion
Petersen Sand provides a useful guide for courts faced with
the so-called passive disposal issue in the future. Quite
simply, under RCRA's definition of "disposal," unless a
former owner or operator at some point undertook an act
or omission with respect to hazardous substances which
could cause such substances to enter the environment, CER-
CLA liability under §I07(a)(2) should not be imposed.
Viewed in an historical context, Congress-through
RCRA's term "disposal"-did not seek to impose liability
on parties who never engaged in waste disposal activities.
Rather, RCRA and CERCLA have consonant goals of re-
quiring those responsible for acts or omissions which ulti-
mately may result in leaking or spilling ("disposal" under
RCRA) or leaching ("release" under CERCLA) to bear
responsibility for the consequences. Although current own-
ers and operators of contaminated sites can certainly argue
that CERCLA does impose liability for mere possession of
property," courts should not expand CERCLA's broad
liability scheme lightly and without any evidence of culpa-
bility of the parties sought to be held liable."? "[W]here
the imposition of [CERCLA] liability is based on public
policy rather than any conception of fairness or culpability,
the ultimate question for the court must be not the end but
the intended limit [of liability].""
89. CERCLA § 107(a)(I) imposes liability for response costs upon "the
owner and operator of a vessel or facility." 42 U.S.c. §9607(a)(l),
ELR STAT.CERCLA §107(a)(1).
90. See Edward Hines Lumber CO. Y. Vulcan Material Co., 861 F.2d
155, 157, 19 ELR 20187. 20188 (7th ClL 1988).
91. United States v. Petersen Sand & Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346,
1353,23 ELR 20480, 20483 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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